Rational credences are private by McCutcheon, Randall G.
Rational credences are private
In this brief note I present a puzzle, or class of puzzles, that I ran across in my recent
investigations into the Sleeping Beauty Problem. On the surface it looks like something
of a throwaway, but the problems addressed here are actually, I believe, more central to
philosophy than those that arise in the Sleeping Beauty problem proper. At the end of the
paper I will make an advertisement for the solution I favor, though I think other solutions
are defensible.
1. I can’t believe Sleeping Beauty is Stupid
According to Elga (2010), your subjective probabilities should be sharp. If 0 ≤ q < p ≤ 1
then it cannot be that both q and p can play the “credence in proposition P” role for
you in arbitrary betting scenarios. For if so, you will be indifferent (since q can play the
credence role) to a bet in which you win 1− q if P is true and lose q if P is false, as well
as (since p can play the credence role) a bet in which you lose 1 − p if P is true and win
p if P is false. It’s not rational, argues Elga, to refuse both bets since by accepting both
you could secure a sure gain of p − q. Call this the arbitrage argument. If it succeeds,
all manner of “fuzzily” defined credences (such as interval-valued credences) are ruled out
(says Elga). This would appear to include cases in which an agent “suspends judgment”
as to a credence. I will refer to this claim as sharpness.
Meanwhile in the Sleeping Beauty thought experiment, it’s generally taken as a truism
that Beauty must have the same credences during each awakening.1 So far as I know there
are no objections from anyone on this point. Indeed, it’s so taken for granted that it’s
not easy to find specific formulations of the claim, which I will refer to as consistency.2
Finally, by publicity I will refer to the policy that Beauty reports her true credences.
Several solutions to the Sleeping Beauty problem have emerged, perhaps four of which
might be considered “serious contenders.” They are:
1. The one-third solution (Elga 2000). Here Beauty has credence 1
3
in heads at wakeup, 2
3
in Monday at wakeup and 1
2
in heads after learning Monday. This is the majority view.
1In case you haven’t heard, Sleeping Beauty is a subject in an odd experiment. She
will be awakened on Monday morning, told what day it is, put back to sleep and then, if
a toss of a fair coin lands tails, she will have all memory of Monday’s awakening erased
and will be awakened again on Tuesday, to again be told what day it is and put back to
sleep. (If the coin lands heads, she sleeps through Tuesday.) In any event, she wakes up
on Wednesday and the experiment is concluded. The problem is what Beauty’s temporal
credences ought to be at wakeup and after being told what day it is.
2I leave it open whether consistency follows from sharpness.
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2. The one-half solution (Lewis 2001). Here Beauty has credence 1
2
in heads at wakeup, 3
4
in Monday at wakeup and 2
3
in heads after learning Monday.
3. The double halfer position (Halpern 2004, White 2006; see Dorr 2005 for criticism).
Here Beauty has credence 1
2
in heads at wakeup, 3
4
(or unspecified) in Monday at wakeup
and 1
2
in heads after learning Monday.
4. The optimist positions (Hawley 2012)3. Here Beauty has full credence in Monday at
wakeup.
In this paper I argue that Beauty, in order to have coherent credences at all, must either
(a) suspend judgment about the truth of a certain centered proposition, (b) allow herself
the option of having distinct credences on the two days of the experiment, (c) keep her true
credences private or (d) adopt an optimist position. The centered proposition referred to
in (a) is harmless enough...in fact a version will be given in which it’s simply the assertion
that a certain coin currently lies heads.
Main Claim. If Beauty has coherent personal credences at wakeup and subscribes to all
of sharpness, consistency and publicity then she must be an optimist.
Proof. At wakeup, Beauty considers the following proposition:
C: Either today is Monday and the coin lands heads or today is Tuesday and my Monday
credence in “C” was not more than my credence in heads.
By “C” Beauty intends (on Tuesday) the proposition that was identified yesterday (Mon-
day) by the same characters that identify C today (Tuesday). Since therefore “C” has a
referent which is fixed prior to the act of interpretation fixing C, there is no regress that
would render C unintelligible.4 Indeed, C can be made entirely concrete:
3The optimist position advanced by Hawley is of course the one in which Beauty has
credence 1
2
in heads at wakeup.
4In contrast, Caie (2013) seeks to sabotage coherence of rational credences with:
(*) Yuko’s credence that (*) is true isn’t greater than or equal to 0.5.
But this “proposition” is self-referential, and will be excluded by any reasonable extension
of type theory. Good riddance; like the liar’s mantra, (*) can’t be unpacked. One pass:
(*) Yuko’s credence that ‘Yuko’s credence that (*) is true isn’t greater than
or equal to 0.5’ is true isn’t greater than or equal to 0.5.
Which is no closer to ground, so there’s a regress. Failing to parse, (*) is just nonsense.
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Harvey Dent (aka Two-Face) has captured Batman and plans to
subject him to Monday and possibly Tuesday awakenings. Prior
to the Monday awakening, Harvey has tossed a fair coin out of
view. During it, he asks Batman for his credences in heads = the
original toss landed heads, Monday and heads = the coin currently
lies heads. If now the original toss landed tails, Batman’s memory
of the first awakening is erased and he has a second. Prior to the
second awakening, Harvey places the coin in the heads position
if and only if Batman’s credence in heads was not greater than
his credence in heads during the first awakening, then again asks
Batman’s credences. Batman knows the protocol. Harvey promises
Batman that he’ll die if he fails to respond with coherent credences.
Assuming consistency, Let h, h andm be Batman’s credences in heads, heads andMonday,
respectively. Now heads holds if either this is Monday and heads or if this is Tuesday and
h ≤ h. In other words, heads is co-extensive with C. We must establish that m = 1.
If m = 0 then h = 0, which means that (modulo null sets) heads holds if and only if
h = Cred(heads) = 0, and Batman’s credences are incoherent. So we may assume m > 0.
Case 1: h > h. Here heads is coextensive with heads, as the coin lies tails on Tuesday. So
h = Cred(heads) = Cred(heads) = h, a contradiction.
Case 2: h ≤ h. Here heads is true if it’s Monday and heads or if it’s Tuesday. So
h ≥ h
= Cred(heads)
= Cred(Monday) · Cred(heads|Monday) + Cred(Tuesday) · Cred(heads|Tuesday)
= m ·
h
m
+ (1−m) · 1 = h+ (1−m) ≥ h.
It follows that the inequalities are equalities, which implies that m = 1.
2. It was a Dark and unideal Knight
So either optimism is necessary or publicity, consistency, and sharpness fail to cohere;
Batman must either live with the former or get rid of one of the latter.
Jettisoning publicity seems an attractive option for Batman if he can pull it off, but it isn’t
clear that he can. Thought-reading devices that could detect his true credences, or at least
detect lying, seem logically and perhaps even nomologically possible. Doing away with
consistency looks problematic; indeed, I see no way of doing it except by employing some
random process, in which case it would be difficult to defend the claim that the values
3
generated represented credences at all. Finally to deny sharpness, say by suspending
judgment in the Batman game, looks problematic (at least at first blush), as we could just
require that Two-Face always place the coin in the heads position when Batman suspends
judgment, so that suspension becomes as self-defeating and unstable a position as any
sharp credence. (Though I don’t favor it, I do nevertheless think that it’s coherent to deny
sharpness. See below.)
And yet optimism seems an affront to the intuition that, for all Batman knows, it might
well be Tuesday. Moreover, adopting optimism doesn’t appear to get one out of the woods
anyway, as the problem can be made to appear outside of Sleeping Beauty experiments.
Consider the following.
The Great Predictor has placed a coin under a cup and then asked
you to give your credence in heads. However, the Great Predictor
assures you that his prediction skills are very great indeed, and
that he has placed the coin in the heads position if, and only if,
your credence h in heads will be not more than 1
2
.
Like the Batman case, The Great Predictor example purports to subject a rational agent
(you) to a bout of “believed-of-oneself anti-expertise”: any credence in heads you might
adopt appears to be self-defeating, despite the fact that what your credences are can’t seem
to affect the status of the coin, which was placed before your credences were determined.
Many philosophers view “Great Predictors” with skepticism. (As David Lewis once said
of the original Newcomb thought experiment, “Some philosophers have refused to learn
anything from such a tall tale.”) At any rate, what I think the Predictor scenario shows
is that it’s either publicity or sharpness that must be parted with in the Batman case, as
denial of consistency or optimism won’t carry over to the Predictor case anyway.
The issue even appears to arise in the following “low budget” experiment: I (who have no
memory-erasing drug or prediction skills) ask your credence that I will presently place a
coin in the heads position after promising that I will place it in the heads position if and
only if your reported credence is not greater than 1
2
. Of course I can’t read your mind,
so the temptation to drop publicity here is strong. Otherwise, sharpness is in trouble. Of
course, one could try to selectively create exclusions to sharpness...not require yourself to
have credence in any event lying in the causal cone of your would-be credence in it.
But that’s problematic for decision theory. Can I not have a credence in the proposition
that I will die in a traffic accident, because such credence will affect how I decide to
drive? Probably in that case there’s some equilibrium credence that makes sense. But
do equilibrium credences always make sense? If a madman asks your credence r that he
will kill you in five minutes after promising to do so with probability 1 − r2, must you
necessarily adopt r = −1+
√
5
2
? You would much rather answer with something like r = 1.
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But enough. If Elga’s argument is all sharpness has going for it then trashing it looks
plausible, as the arbitrage argument doesn’t seem to work in the problem cases, try as one
might to make it so. (Details, which are murky indeed, left to the reader.) Nevertheless,
I prefer to bite the bullet and get rid of publicity instead. My intuition is that I should
always have credences. Privacy allows me to have stable ones. It’s also something of a
godsend for the evidential version of decision theory, which is almost surely a good thing.
These considerations look weightier to me than does the threat of a mind-reading device
that no one, not even an ideal rational agent, can fool.
Of course some (including David Lewis) have claimed that one should adopt a decision
theory appropriate to a non-ideal rational agent. I disagree. In order for a theory to
persist in the face of a departure from idealness, there has to be some systematicity in the
departure. Real gasses, for example, may have behavior that is not explained precisely
by the ideal gas law, but, owing to the systematicity of the departure of real gasses from
idealness, scientists may be able to gather empirical data and build a more predictive (if
more complicated) theory for real gasses. But what goes for gasses doesn’t go for agents
striving to behave rationally, because to whatever extent their irrationality is systematic,
it can be corrected, for, as Hegel put it, “the very fact that something is determined as a
limitation implies that the limitation is already transcended.”
Yes, I quoted Hegel. No, that doesn’t make for much of an argument. But then this isn’t
much of a paper.
———————
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